• Oro [she/they]@beehaw.org
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    1 year ago

    I used to run a multi-monitor desktop setup with Xorg, via the nVidia drivers. Two identical monitors, single framebuffer, no scaling, no tearing, single vsync.

    One monitor, one framebuffer, an old use case that for some doesn’t even exist now, inefficient and slow tearing prevention, laggy vsync.

    That wasn’t a multi-monitor desktop setup. That was a hacked together multi-display, single-screen setup.

    Also why would you link an LD_PRELOAD attack? That’s not Wayland-specific in any way. Any other protocol and library is vulnerable to that too. But let’s point out one major issue with that: the LD_PRELOAD needs to be loaded in before the compositor in order to be relevant. With X, you can do that at runtime. Let’s also read the README from the repository:

    This program is in no way meant as criticism of the Wayland project. It simply demonstrates that creating a secure desktop requires more than just a few server-side restrictions.

    Wayland isn’t the only software we need for a secure desktop; it just handles making the display secure. For libraries and application sandboxing, you want Flatpak, and we’re making progress on dynamic permissions there.

    So? What’s your point? Nothing here is a Wayland-specific argument. Your setup wasn’t functional, it was fundamentally a hack, and one that not-NVIDIA/Intel/AMD hardware doesn’t support. Your argument is falling flat on its face.