Data Science

  • 54 Posts
  • 313 Comments
Joined 1 year ago
cake
Cake day: June 17th, 2023

help-circle

  • I’ve read that. Defining a supplier as someone with whom you have a direct business relationship with seems intentionally narrow in an unhelpful way that just further muddies the waters around the issue at hand. Making something generally available to others means that you’re supplying others with that thing. While it’s true that you may have no further obligations to those that receive your software, the person receiving the software needs to evaluate their risks around using and depending on that software regardless of the existence of a business relationship with the supplier. Hence supply chain risk evaluation is always necessary. That risk evaluation, or lack thereof, can result in a security problem. These problems can propagate widely within a software ecosystem. This is true with and without the existence of direct business relationships between suppliers and recipients of software.

    The whole article can be summarized by saying if you want support services related to the software written by others, negotiate a support agreement related to that software. That has nothing to do with taking a wide or narrow interpretation of the word supplier.




















  • Building from source is the opposite of hacky. It’s the recommended way to deal with things like this where you are concerned about trust and security. I understand that it’s not something you’ve done before, but it not as complicated as it sounds. There are many tutorials on how to build programs from source.

    I understand that providing official packages for fedora/rhel, Ubuntu/debian, and arch-based distro packages along with a flatpack and Appimage would make a lot of sense, but for whatever reason, signal has decided not to. Perhaps you can message the signal team to ask why they choose not to do this.



  • I’ve been comparing crates on crates.io against their upstream repositories in an effect to detect (and, ultimately, help prevent) supply chain attacks like the xz backdoor1, where the code published in a package doesn’t match the code in its repository.

    The results of these comparisons for the most popular 9992 crates by download count are now available. These come with a bunch of caveats that I’ll get into below, but I hope it’s a useful starting point for discussing code provenance in the Rust ecosystem.

    No evidence of malicious activity was detected as part of this work, and approximately 83% of the current versions of these popular crates match their upstream repositories exactly.